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1WEATHER INSURANCE OF WINE 






To develop weather insurance, GROUPAMA builds a general model of agronomic crop yield 
density function. This approach is applied for cereal, industrial products, wine and fruits. 
From the density function, weather risk premium is computed. The wine-producing practices 
disturb our approach of risks. First, wine yields are limited by public regulations. Second, 
some cooperatives applied quality regulations. Then, observed crop yields are not agronomic 
crop yields needed by the model. 
The paper proposes a simulation process to estimate the agronomic parameters of areas crop 
yields from observed crop yields data. This process is tested on Champagne wine historical 
data. We measure too the impact of the quantity rules on our estimation of premium. Next, the 
paper analyses impact on quality on the idiosyncratic risk and on the premium.  
It results that agronomic parameters give cheaper premium estimation. Because rigorous 
growing process is implemented, include quality risk is not systemically more expensive but 
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21  Introduction 
 
To develop weather insurance, GROUPAMA
1 builds a general model of agronomic crop 
yield density function. This approach is applied for cereal, industrial products, wine and 
fruits. Model parameters are estimated from historical areas crop yields data. The model 
integrates trend, mean and standard deviation. Some assumptions by culture let us define an 
individual crop yield density function. From this individual crop yield density function, 
weather risk premium is computed. 
 
The wine-producing of “High Quality Wine” (noted AOC or VDQS in French) practices 
disturb our approach of risks. First, wine yields are limited by public regulations. Second, 
some cooperatives applied quality regulations according to sugar density, quality control or 
impurities content. Then, cooperatives calculate an equivalent yield of wine. Quality losses 
are often due to weather random, GROUPAMA has to include also the notion of ‘equivalent 
crop yield’ in the model. 
 
Then, observed crop yields are not agronomic crop yields needed by the model and the 
questions are: How to include quantity and quality regulations in the model? What are 
regulations impacts on the premiums? 
2 Context 
Agricultural insurance is a major subject of agricultural politics and of agricultural economic 
sciences.  In France, the last public agricultural report largely deals with insurance 
(MORTEMOUSSE D., 2007). Large literature exists on revenue, crop or weather insurance. For 
example, TURVEY, WEERSINK, and CHIANG (2006) deal with the ice-wine harvest insurance in 
the Ontario, US. They propose a contract based on the number of hour where temperature is 
between -8°C and -12°C during the winter harvest season. GROUPAMA, the first French 
agricultural insurer, aspires to be an active participant in the farm risk protection 
development. 
 
The wine sector is worth specific developments. First, French wine harvest represents 5,396 
billion of litres in 2006, a significant part of French agriculture. Second, wine producers 
suffer from an international slump. In fact, French people consumed 104 litres of wine per 
year in 1975 and only 54 litres in 2005. Considered in the past as a food, wine is today a 
pleasure. Moreover, wineries and distribution industries answer to demand but French farms 
carry often on the past flavour. Farms are now more sensible to risks and then, need 
protection from this insurer. The wine industry was mobilising (see for example CESAR et al 
2005 ; AMORIM,2005). Third and at last, quantity and quality regulations affect risks model 
and the measure of premium. In fact, public and private rules disturb the data. For example in 
1995, the ‘Champagne’ agronomic yield was estimated at 14 500 kg/ha even else the 
maximum yield was 11 000 and the observed yield was 10986 (from professional sources).  
 
The model framework could be declined in two parts. On the one hand, the areas crop yield 
density gets on literature. On the other hand, we present GROUPAMA approach because this 
study adds up a previous work of GROUPAMA which restricts model choices. 
  
As shown in literature, normal density function does not suit for areas crop yields density 
function (RAMIREZ et al, 2003). Even if right skewness crop density exists, authors present the 
                                                 
1   Model was developed by the Actuary Service of GROUPAMA SA, 2003. 
3case of Texas cotton, we observe generally a left skewness (Soybean and corn was analysed 
in this paper).  We found in literature other adapted density functions. For example, NELSON 
and PRECKEL prefer beta density function. RAMIREZ et al  (1997) argues that the inverse sinus 




Figure 1:  Illustration of the general crop yield density function. 
 
 
Source: Own representation. 
 
In 2000, the BABUSIAUX Public Report offered a framework to the crop yield Insurance in 
France. The state subsidies 35 % of the (25% deductible) premium contract which cover the 
crop yield loss consecutively to weather random. Price risk is not including. 
Then, GROUPAMA had to estimate the risk premium for 60 cultures in 96 countries 
(department). GROUPAMA insurance contract could be describe as following:  
 
where I represents the indemnity, D the deductible in % and  t i y ,  the expected crop yield. 
 
According the literature model and observed data, GROUPAMA develop his own model of 
agronomic crop yield density function (see too ODJO H. and V. RITZ, 2006). It uses a function 
l such as 
1 − l  is known and  ) (y l  could be described by lognormal density.  This density 
function is illustrated in Figure 1. Algebraic premium estimation could be deduced from our 
assumptions. 
 
This paper targets to improve the GROUPAMA’s model in the wine producer’s case, not to 
revisit it. 
) ) 1 ( , 0 ( , , , t i t i t i y D y Max I − − × =  
43  Preliminaries Calculus: the idiosyncratic risk component 
 
Idiosyncratic risk is the contribution of the farm in risk. This component of risk could be 
pooled in contrario of the systemic risk. As explain by RAMASWANI et al (2003), two usual 
approaches let to include idiosyncratic risk component: the additive approach or the 
multiplicative approach. Authors confirm that classification of risk as either systemic or no 
systemic changes with the area size used for computing area yield. For example, MAHUL and 




The multiplicative approach considers  t i, ξ  as:  
 
 
Authors conclude: “The literature assumes the Linear Additive Model. […] The Linear 
Additive Model decomposes individual producer yield into a systemic component due to area 
yield variation and to an independent additive producer specific component. While previous 
work has established the convenience for analysing area yield insurance [performance to 
reduce farm’s risk], its theoretical justification has be neglected. In spite of its likeness of the 
CAPM model of finance, the Linear Additive Model cannot be validated in a similar manner.” 
 
Here, the second approach is preferred because:  
1)  It is an implicit assumption in previous work of GROUPAMA. 
2)  The multiplicative approach is easier and more logical when lognormal distribution is 
used. 
3)  Data confirms that approach suits (see quality analyze in section 5).  
 
Then, from equation 2, we propose the following relation between  t i y , ,   t a y ,  and  t i, ξ : 
 







  is introduced to obtain the standardized individual random 
value  t i, ξ . 
 
                                                 
2   Please notes the following notations: subscript t for the time, subscript i for the individual farmers, subscript 
a for the areas. 
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54  Quantity rules impacts on wine crop yield risk 
4.1  Methodology to approach the agronomic crop yield 
 
This paper aims to define the more adapted model parameters in the case of wine quantity 
regulations. As illustrate in Figure 2, the wine crop limit change the crop yield density 
function. Usual parameterization of the agronomic density does not suit and then, agronomic 
parameters are unknown. Limit changes each year and is noted  t M y , . If we note  t i y , ˆ  the 
agronomic crop yield, we have  ) ˆ , ( , , , t i t M t i y y Min y = . 
 
Figure 2:  Illustration of the individual wine yield density function. 
 
 
Source: Own representation. 
 
 
6Figure 3:  Relation between agronomic and observed wine crop yields 
 
Source: Own representation. 
 
As illustrate in Figure 3, a simple relation exist from  t i y , ˆ  to  t i y , , but not from  t i y ,  to  t i y , ˆ . 
Therefore, with GROUPAMA assumptions, a statistical relation let us approximate   t a y ,  from 
t a y , ˆ . But the reciprocal relation is not true. According to the complexity of rules, we use 
simulation to estimate optimal agronomic yields parameters. Then, what are the optimal 
parameters for  t a y ,  random? 
 
Simulations offer an answer at this question. We could test a large number of assumptions  
j H  = Arbitrary parameters suit. 
j H  is accepted when simulated  t a y ,  mean and standard deviation correspond to observed  t a y ,  
mean and standard deviation. 
 
4.2   Historical data of ‘Champagne’ 
 
Champagne’s wine is known through the world. We have crop yield data from 1901 and the 
limit yield from 1961. We know the agronomic yield during 16 years, too. Then, these data let 
us to understand how quantity regulation affects the model and control the performance of our 
simulation process to estimate agronomic yields parameters. 
 
We observed the real difference of the agronomic and observed crop yield statistics (see 
Table 5). Because of regulations, mean and variability of the observed crop yields are less 
than agronomic mean and variability. Wine data confirm the pertinence of agronomic trend 
and the left skewness density of the crop yield.  
 
4.3    Agronomics ‘Champagne’ wine parameters using simulations  
 
We use the following algorithm to found agronomic parameters: 
t a y , ˆ  
t a y ,  
t i y , ˆ
t i y ,
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7Year from 1990 to 2006 
  List of Agronomic parameters Σj 
Counter of areas random a= 1 to Na 
Compute areas random  
  Counter of farms random i=1 to Ni 
  Compute individual random  
  Compute individual agronomic crop yield 
  Compute individual observed crop yield 
  End  
Compute areas observed crop yield 
End  
  End  
End 
   
How number simulations are needed? We know the standard deviation of   t a y ,  noted  ( ) a y σ . 
As presented by ELIE and LAPEYRE, (2001), to obtain a mean in  a a y E ∆ ± ] [  with a 95% 
probability, we have to realize Na simulations: 
For % 1 = ∆a , we need Na=30. Next if we search the same precision (1%  ] ˆ [ ,t a y E ) of each 




















8Table 1:  Statistic and Results of the Champagne crop wine insurance  





Observed areas crop yield  11 280  1 705  15.11%  -89% 
Agronomic Champagne Yield  14 847  3 669  24.71%  29% 
Agronomic Champagne Yield 
minus the linear trend 
(*)  7
  3 486  20.95%  -48% 
Maximum crop yield  11 785  1 280  10.86%   
Simulations without trend 
(***)  21 350  5503  25.77%   
Simulations with knowing 
trend  22600 5373 23.7%   
Premium 
(**) using agronomic 
parameters (without trend)  4.44% 
Premium 
(**) with observed 
parameters  7.13% 
Premium 
(**)  without trend  6.79% 
Premium 
(**)  with knowing 




Deductible: Indemnity is paid when crop yield is 
under 10 000kg  
(*)   The expected value of agronomic crop yield is estimated to 19 360kg in 2005. 
(**)  Premiums are without charges and taxes. 
(***)  The more pertinent result, convergence is not obtained. 
Source: Own representation. 
Some conclusion comments: 
1.  Premium is really minor with the agronomic parameters. Then, quantity regulations 
have an impact on the premium estimation. 
2.  If trend is unknown, we do not have the convergence.  
3.  With trend, simulation approaches the result but not provides exact solution.  
Unknown agronomic trend is a real obstacle of our approach; we do not have agronomic data 
or agronomic trend information for other wine areas. 
 
5  How include the quality of wine? 
5.1  Methodology to include quality wine risk 
 
The first risk of many farms production is the quantity risk. Nevertheless, quality risk is a 
significant risk of wine production. Then, how to include the quality in the insurance contract 
in the model? 
 
We analyse the case of a French wine cooperative. It provides a book of specifications for 
wine quality classes and quantity limitation. Before the subscription, the cooperative defines a 
table which each quality class impact on the price. This impact is represented by a coefficient 
and depends on the grape density of sugar (or the wine degree) and on the ES index. 
 
9Table 2:  Book of specification: Impact of quality on price.  
Degree  ES index = 1  ES index = 2  ES index = 3  ES index = 4 
10.90° - 11.40°  >>  >>  0.5  0.0 
11.50° - 11.90°  >>  0.8  0.5  0.0 
12.00° - 12.50°  1  0.8  0.5  0.0 
12.50° - 13.00°  1  0.8  0.5  0.0 
Source: Own representation. 
 
Then, we have a quality function noted Q on the price. We could merge quality and quantity 
results in an equivalent crop yield noted y’ calculated as following:  
t i t i t i t i y Index Degree Q y , , , , ) , ( ' × =  
 
 
From equation 3, we derive the following relation between  t i y , ',    t a y ,  and  t i, ξ  in the case of 
quantity and quality risk measure: 
 
 
First, we have to describe and analyse the cooperative quantity and quality data. Second, we 
measure the dependence between  t i, ξ   and  t a y , . At last, we have to compound these both risk 
to define the premium. 
 
5.2    Data of cooperative 
 
Cooperative gets together 140 wine farmers. We have quality and quantity data from 2000 to 
2006. Equivalent crop yields are calculated independently for each variety of grapes. We 
aggregate data by farmers and by year.  
The reference price of wine is 140€ per hl. 
We deduce from figures 4 and 5 that cooperative farmers are heterogeneous. 43 farmers 
(33%) have expected revenue more than 8 000€. Nevertheless, these farmers represent 74% of 
the aggregate expected revenue. Only the farmers that have expected revenue more than 
8000€ are considered because: 
1.  Farms are more homogeneous, 
2.  The liability of yield is better, 
3.  Insurance contract targets these farms.  
 
 
()( ) ( ) ( )
() () () t a
i
a
t i t i t i t i t i y
y E
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y Index Degree Q y , , , , , , '
) , ( ' l
l
l
l l × × = × = ξ , with  ( ) 1 , = t i E ξ   (5)
10Figure 4:  The cumulative farm’s revenue in the cooperative. 
 
Source: Own representation. 
 
Figure 5:  Cumulative farm’s number  
 
Source: Own representation. 
 
5.3    Individual quality and quantity risk measure and results 
 
We could now testing the log-normality of  t i, ξ  for the more 8  000€ revenue of the high 
quality wine farms. SAS let us simply testing the normality of  ) exp( ,t i ξ  using the 
UNIVARIATE procedure. 
11We obtain (112 values): 
Table 3:  SAS results of normality test of  ) exp( ,t i ξ .  
Tests for Normality 
Test Statistic  P  Value 
Shapiro-Wilk  W  0.982588 Pr < W  0.1533 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  D  0.057478 Pr > D  >0.1500 
Cramer-von Mises  W-Sq 0.063649 Pr > W-Sq >0.2500 
Anderson-Darling  A-Sq  0.475492 Pr > A-Sq  0.2404 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Therefore, Shapiro-Wilk, Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Cramer-von Mises tests let us accepted 
the log-normal assumption (see Table 3). The P Value of the Anderson-Darling test is near of 
the usual trigger 0.25. 
Next, we test the dependence between systemic risk component  t a y ,  (areas yields) and the 
idiosyncratic risk component   t i, ξ   (individual risk). Via a CORR procedure, SAS let us 
measure the dependence between  t i, ξ  and  t a y ,  within the meaning of Hoeffning. It results: 
Table 4:  SAS results relative to the dependence between  t i, ξ  and  t a y ,  within the 
meaning of Hoeffning.  
Dependence coefficient for Hoeffding, N = 112 Prob > D under H0: D=0 
 Areas  Yield  Epsiloni 








Source: Own calculations.  
From Table 4, the non-dependence assumption is accepted.  
We remind of the product of two independent lognormal random is a log-normal where the 





2 , , v v m m v m + + = . We could now compute the premium estimation. 
Results are shown in Table 4. 
 
12Table 5:  Synthetics results of climatic risk premium (deductible 0% relative of the 
expected yield) 
 Mean  Standard  deviation 
Observed statistic of areas yield  43.05 hl/ha  7.13 
Agronomic statistic of areas yield  44.5 hl/ha  7.45 
Statistic of   t i, ξ   1.012 0.0836 
Premium rate without agronomic statistics and without quality risk  11.78%   
Premium rate with agronomic statistics and without quality risk  11.91%   
Premium rate with agronomic statistics and with quality risk  9.32%   
Source: Own calculations.  
The yield areas mean is largely under the 50 hl/ha limit. Then, the quantity regulation does 
not affect the areas yield parameters, and does not affect the risk premium. Why? Official’s 
statistics and agronomical experts of GROUPAMA confirm the low number of wine specialist 
farms. Wine suffers from non-optimal climate and is often only an additional production. 
Then the productivity is low. 
 
The rate for insurance premium of the quality and quantity risks is minor than only quantity 
risks. Why? 
1.  For quantity insurance, our model includes our usual idiosyncratic risk component 
assumptions. Regard to the specificities of the area study here, our approach is not 
adapted. Probably, quantity risk is over estimated. 
2.  Only a little population is selected for the quality. Parameters are not estimated with 
the same perimeter.  
3.  Because rigorous grape growing process is implanted, it results probably a better risk 
control. In this cooperative, the quality process could be reward by a lower premium 
and a better protection. 
To evaluate the quantity and quality risk premium we must compute a specific measure of 




Because of quantity regulations, mean and variability of the observed crop yields of wine are 
less than agronomic mean and variability. All things being equal, premium decreases with 
expected yields and increases with variability. Then, the both impacts of regulations are 
opposed on estimated premium. Nevertheless, results show that estimated premium is really 
cheaper using agronomic parameters.  
When trend of agronomic wine crop yield is known, simulation is powerful. Unknown 
agronomic trend is a real obstacle of our approach; we do not have agronomic data or 
agronomic trend information for other wine areas. 
Then, we have to include quantity wine regulation in premium estimation. Too, we have to 
provide our approach to compute agronomic crop yield parameters estimation. 
 
13To evaluate the quantity and quality risk premium we must compute a specific measure of 
risk. This measure depends first on the areas variability and on book of specification of the 
cooperative. Because rigorous grape growing process is implanted, it results probably a better 
risk control. In the analyzed cooperative, the quality process could be reward by a lower 
premium and a better protection. 
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